A poll conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Social
Studies last year, showed that most of the Ukrainians polled — 61
percent of women and 51 percent of men — were of the opinion that the
social status of men was higher than that of women. At the same time, 81
percent of women were determined to champion more actively the cause of
women in their struggle against social injustice and traditions
favouring male dominance.
A cursory look
A cursory look at the women’s position in the Ukrainian society of today and in the past may give one a wrong impression that a
women’s liberation movement of the kind that has been so aggressive in
the past several decades, is hardly needed in Ukraine. Or so the male
chauvinists will claim. They will provide a plethora of examples from
the Ukrainian history and folklore, substantiating their point of view.
Take, for example, they will say, such Ukrainian women as Princess Olga,
the wise, tenth-century ruler of Kyiv and the first Christian in the
land of Kyiv, whom even the Byzantine emperor treated with respect and
even offered his hand in marriage (she sagaciously turned down the
emperor’s proposal); or Nastya Lisovska, a girl from Polissya, who in
the sixteenth century became a beloved wife of Suleiman the Magnificent,
the Sultan of Turkey (1520–1566) under whose governance the Ottoman
Empire reached the height of its power, not without advisory help from
Roxolana (Nastya’s Turkish name); or Lesya Ukrayinka, the prominent
Ukrainian author of the late 19th-early 20th century, who was called
“the only true man in Ukrainian literature” by a leading literary critic
and poet. And of course some of the Ukrainian rural traditions will be
mentioned which seem to point out to a relative independence of
Ukrainian women even in the times of old — a girl, for instance, who
despite the insistence of her parents, did not want to marry someone who
had proposed to her, would send the suitor a pumpkin, a sign of
rejection, without succumbing to the parental pressure.
The Ukrainian women are described as being beautiful,
excellent housewives, clever with her hands, doing marvellous
embroideries, needlework, weaving — you name it. The Ukrainian women
seem to be held in high respect by politicians of varying rank, from top
to bottom, who, in their speeches call them “keepers of the hearth,”
“hope and saviours of the state.” Women are called upon “to be
guarantors of peace and goodwill in the family,” to devote themselves
“to raising the new generations of Ukrainians, the future of the
nation,” “to be active participants of the social life,” “to…” The list
is too long. Incidentally, who are the women called upon by?
A closer look
A closer look at the social and family position of
Ukrainian women will reveal quite a different picture. In their absolute
majority, Ukrainian women are run-down, worn-out, with very little time
left after work and house chores to take care of herself. Ukrainian
women are accustomed to suffer and being resigned to their fate for the
sake of their children, they have a heightened sense of duty and
responsibility, they take on so much on themselves, they do so much for
the family and for society, but they find that the proverbial “man’s
shoulder” on which they supposedly can lean for support in most cases
turns out to be either not strong enough or absent altogether.
The many issues connected with the position of women in
Ukrainian society began to be raised and looked into much more
vigorously than ever before after Ukraine’s independence. In the context
of “the national revival,” such roles, “most natural for women” and
“sanctified by God and history,” as “mother,” “wife,” “guardian of
traditions and spirituality” were proclaimed as “inviolable” and
“eternal.” And the newest feminist theories which come to Ukraine from
the west are mostly dismissed as “not applicable to the conditions that
exist in Ukraine.”
Literary critics — female critics, of course, rather
than male — were the first to begin to advocate the applicability —
and necessity — of feminist theories in Ukraine. In 1990, Solomiya
Pavlychko, a remarkable person, literary critic and translator,
initiated a feminist seminar, the first of its kind, to be held in
Ukraine. The venue, ironically, was the arch-conservative Institute of
Literature. The Osnovy Publishing House that Pavlychko had founded,
published translations of such important feminist works as The Second
Sex by Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986; French writer, existentialist, and
feminist) and The Sexual Politics by Kate Milet. International grants
began to be awarded for conducting gender research; seminars, social
surveys and polls, dealing with the role and position of women in
Ukrainian society began to be held; feminist centres began to be set —
characteristically, most of these things with the help of western money.
“By God, I’ll divorce you!”
Odarka, the main protagonist of Hulak-Artemovsky’s
famous opera, Zaporozhets za Dunayem (A Zaporizhian Cossack beyond the
Danube), written in the nineteenth century and based on the events of
the previous century, sings, in a heated argument with her Cossack
husband Karas, “By God, I’ll divorce you!” Obviously, very few of her
contemporaries in other countries could get rid of their husbands in
such a legal way — the right to initiate divorce and break the marriage
bonds at that time was still denied to women in practically all
European countries. A scrutiny of the Ukrainian history does reveal that
the legal status of women, at least at the level of the upper and
middle classes, provided them with rights not available to women in
other countries.
In the early periods of Ukrainian mediaeval history,
marriages were agreed upon by the parents or close relatives of the
future husband and wife, with the bride excluded from the final
decision, but there is enough historical evidence that suggests that the
bride’s interests were taken into account. During the reign of the Kyiv
Prince Yaroslav the Wise, the Civil Code was drawn and the articles
dealing with the position of women in the then society, marriage and
dissolution of marriage show that women were given a certain degree of
freedom in marital matters. A monetary fine was imposed on a woman’s
parents not only in case of her committing suicide to avoid being forced
into marriage, but also in cases when the parents refused to allow a
daughter to marry someone of her own choice.
In contrast to Western Europe, in the Ukraine of the
16th–17th centuries, it was the material status of women themselves that
determined her social position rather than the social position of their
husbands. Women-landowners paid taxes and this fact indicated that they
enjoyed the full rights of membership of the then society. Women were
entitled to filling official posts, such as starosta (local
administrator or governor), they even could inherit the office of
starosta. Women took an active part in local self-government and were
influential in the social and political life of Ukrainian cities.
When Ukraine was incorporated into the Russian and
Austrian Empires with the last vestiges of independence completely gone
in the eighteenth century, the legal status of women in the Ukrainian
lands went through a drastic change. In the lands dominated by the
Russian Empire, the Russian laws were in force, and some of the articles
of the Criminal and Civil Codes were openly discriminatory towards
women. The system of serfdom robbed the women serfs of any rights
whatsoever.
In the Soviet times, a sort a feminist movement did
exist in Ukraine but it was very much different from what it was in the
west. Soviet society, in which everybody was obliged to work (“those who
don’t work, do not eat”) viewed women mostly as “mothers” and
“workers,” combining these two functions. The Soviet Constitutions of
1936 and of 1977 declared equal rights for men and women but any
unbiased and even perfunctory study immediately reveals that these
Constitutions are based, as far as women are concerned, on the deeply
ingrained patriarchal stereotypes — the men were treated as the driving
force and model for society, whereas women were relegated to being
solely the homemakers and caretakers of the family.
The “Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic” of 1978 did contain articles dealing with “full equiality of
all the citizens,” but even the official propaganda could not completely
hide the outrageous facts of discrimination against women in all the
spheres of life. The ruling stereotypes remained traditionally
patriarchal — women should concern themselves with their families, and
the official ratification in 1980 of the UN Convention “On Doing Away
with All the Forms of Discrimination against Women” did not change
anything.
Woman-Protectress and Ukraine Viewed as Woman
For the Ukrainians, “the family” and “the idea of
national sovereignty” have always been among the top values. In this
context, Ukrainian Berehynya (Protecting goddess) carries the features
of Ukraine-Woman, the mythical notion that views Ukraine as a
woman-figure. This view was actively promoted by certain circles of the
Ukrainian men from the upper classes in the period from the eighteenth
to the early twentieth century.
By the end of the seventeenth century, the myth of
Ukraine-Woman had come to supplement the myth of the Cossack Republic,
viewed as an Orthodox brotherhood of free men, the brotherhood built the
principles of honesty, comradeship, undaunted courage and chivalrous
valour, and love of nenka-Ukraine (nenka — term of endearment for
mother-tr). At the time when Ukraine lived through a period of political
strife and loss of independence, the myth of Ukraine-Woman acquired
negative features; a woman — mother, sister or sweetheart — raped,
mistreated or even killed. The themes of the destruction of the Cossack
Brotherhood and the ruin of Ukraine that had lost her sons — her
defenders and support, entered the Ukrainian folklore. The plight of
Ukraine is compared, for example, with the fate of a seagull whose
nestlings are trampled underfoot, and who, abused and helpless, is left,
all alone, to suffer on the windswept beach — or on the crossroads of
history.
The image of the abused woman is recurrent in the works
of Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861), the charismatic figure of Ukrainian
culture. It was he who introduced into the public consciousness the
image of Ukraine-Kateryna as a symbol of love that has been denied and
of death that results from love violated.
Shevchenko’s poem Kateryna soon after its publication
acquired a status of a cult work in Ukraine, and women in the
countryside often recited it like a prayer (briefly, the plot of the
poem: a young Ukrainian girl falls in love with a Russian soldier who
soon leaves; Kateryna is pregnant and when she is delivered of a child,
her father throws her out of the house, thus punishing her for the shame
and dishonour Kateryna has brought on the family; homeless and
rejected, Kateryna dies, leaving her son an orphan).
At the end of the 20th century, a new term, mental rape,
gained wide currency (it was borrowed from the theory of colonialism).
The contemporary Ukrainian author Oksana Zabuzhko writes: “Shevchenko
did not talk the language of terms, he talked the language of symbols,
the language of archetypes. But the things he describes perfectly fit
the category of mental rape. In the second quarter of the 19th century,
the number of Ukrainian women who were violated and who gave birth to
bastard children, is estimated to have reached 20,000, and Shevchenko,
of course, knew of this poignant problem resulting from the social vices
of the time and involving thousands upon thousands of women and their
fatherless children. Probably he realized that it signalled the
beginning of colonization of Ukraine — colonization as opposed to
foreign occupation; colonization understood as internal subjugation —
social and mental rape through sexual rape.”
Like any myth that possesses the full set of
characteristics of a myth, the myth about Ukraine-Woman, is
multifaceted. It carries in itself not only the historical codes of the
raped, subjugated nationality, but also positive notions of winning
eternal love — love of Mother-Protectress. In the hardest times of the
Ukrainian history, the Ukrainian women played a very significant social
role as a stabilising factor — they were the Protectresses and
continuers of the nation threatened with extinction. The persevering
tenacity and fertility of the Ukrainian women contributed to the
survival of the Ukrainian nation. On the other hand, the Ukrainian
complexes of being victimized, of searching for an external enemy
responsible for the domestic failures, of servility and of conformity
flourish on the fertile soil of such myths.
Gender and politics
Nowadays, the myth of Ukraine-Woman finds its reflection
in the unbalancing of the gender harmony in the social and political
spheres, with the male principle being self-suppressed and the female
principle being pushed toward a domineering position. Today there are
few women in Ukrainian politics — in the biological sense, as it were,
with most of the politicians being biological males. But these political
males behave in a way traditionally associated with a female type of
behaviour — these political males are weak-willed, spineless,
disoriented, and puerile. If one wants to give examples of the
outstanding, colourful figures who — and it is of a particular
importance — have been unwaveringly consistent in their stance in the
Ukrainian politics of the past few years, women-politicians immediately
come to mind — the late Yaroslava Stetsenko, Yuliya Tymoshenko, Natalya
Vitrenko and Valentyna Semenyuk, to name a few of them. A similar
situation is observed in the Ukrainian political journalism — Yuliya
Mostova, Tetyana Korobova, Olena Prytula. These figures are of different
political affiliations and their role is not necessarily unequivocal,
but they are definitely personalities of a towering stature. It would be
difficult to find men of the same stamina and fortitude among Ukrainian
politicians, except for a few. The main thing that differs them from
male politicians is their staunch adherence to their positions, in
having views all their own, even though these views are sometimes
expressed in hysterical tones.
Unbalancing of the gender harmony can be observed at the
level of ideology as well. For instance, the recently introduced
“multivector” strategy in international priorities of Ukraine is based
on the purely female principle — it is a search for a better partner:
should we be with Europe? Or the USA? Or Russia? Or someone else? The
Ukrainian politicians, for some reason, do not seem to find it necessary
to rephrase the question and ask: And who wants to be with Ukraine?
Or let’s take the decision to scrap the nuclear weapons.
In a symbolical — or even in a strategic-sense it is but
self-emasculation, unmanning, a symbolical castration of a nation.
Man and Woman:
Myths and Realities of Today
The present day Ukrainian women have been saddled with
“a special mission” in the fate of the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian
nation, and Ukrainian culture. And the Ukrainian women continue to bear
the main responsibility for the maintenance of the family. This mission
entails a duty to make this fate happy. And if it is unhappy —
accountability for it. Too much was expected of Ukrainian women, too
many fatal failures occurred in the long course of the Ukrainian
history — and these much too high expectations and these failures have
led to the emergence of “the guilt complex,” and to the “weaker but more
beautiful” part of the Ukrainian nation feeling intimidated and
frustrated — women feel they have failed to fulfil “the mission to save
the nation” imposed upon them. One of the most pernicious and
destructive ideas that was being pushed upon the Ukrainian women was the
idea of self-sacrifice in the interests of others. Self-sacrifice of
this kind is incompatible with the democratic principles in general, and
with the feminist principles in particular, because it robs the woman
of the free will and reduces her to being a puppet. Another sequence of
this ruinous idea, which is not given as much attention as it should be,
is violence at home and sexual abuse which so many women in Ukraine
suffer from. Characteristically, the Law “On Prevention of Violence in
the Family” was passed by parliament only in 2001, that is full ten
years after Ukraine had gained independence.
The tendency to reduce women to their biological
function of motherhood is evident in the traditional Ukrainian culture.
It remains a wide-spread attitude today. “Happy motherhood” is no doubt a
great and wonderful thing, but in Ukraine there is a crippling addition
to the ideal of happy motherhood — ideally, the woman is supposed to
be a working mother. It makes women strive to achieve success in two
separate and not at all overlapping domains — work and motherhood.
There were some feeble attempts in the Soviet times to increase the
birth rates and encourage women to have children but they did not amount
to much since they were mostly confined to “resolutions” and promises.
The independent Ukraine borrowed this approach. Women were given the
right to stay at home raising their children until they are six years of
age (“looking-after-children leave”) instead of three years as it used
to be, but the support money the state pays women is so little that it
is absolutely impossible to support a child on it.
Men: Higher Wages, Better Jobs
There are more women graduates from high schools than
men (57 percent); there are more female students in colleges than male
students (52 percent); only at the level of postgraduate studies there
are more men than women (47 percent are female graduate students). But
there are more women in Ukraine than men with technical or higher
education (43 percent and 34 percent correspondingly).
However, when it comes to employment and wages, it is
the same old story again — men, as a rule, get higher wages, better and
more prestigious jobs, and women are left with routine, less
interesting and less prestigious jobs with lower wages. “The gender
imbalance” is particularly evident in the higher echelons of management
and political power.
In the late 1990s, 57 percent of able-bodied men were
employed (the rest, presumably were self-employed, ran their own
businesses or were unemployed); by contrast, only 43 percent of
able-bodied women were employed. In the countryside, 70 percent of
able-bodied men and 80 percent of able-bodied women were engaged in work
at their plots of land; 13 percent of able-bodied men and only 7
percent of able-bodied women had their own businesses.
In other words, the only sphere of work where Ukrainian women predominate is the toiling at the plots of land in the
countryside — the work of minimal prestige and maximum labour
intensity. And of very little profit. The private business sector is
much less accessible to women than to men. There are very few women —
if any — among the managers and owners of big enterprises, and even in
small — and medium-sized businesses there are many more men than women.
In the past few years, the number of women in jobs
requiring high qualifications and skills has been diminishing, and the
other way round, their share in jobs requiring little or no
qualification has been growing. At the same time, the number of women
among managers, heads of departments, etc., has declined. Among the top
managers there are only 5.8 percent of women, and among managers of
lower levels there are less than 20 percent women.
In the sphere of political life, the same picture is
observed — women are prevented from reaching the higher echelons in
decision making; there are very few women in the leadership of political
parties; the number of male MPs is far greater than the number of
female MPs in the Ukrainian parliament — 95 percent of Verkhovna Rada
deputies are men (out of 450 deputies, 426 are men, which reduces women
MPs’ share to only 5.1 percent).
In the 1970s, Vasyl Stus, the prominent Ukrainian poet
(and dissident; for his championing of the Ukrainian national cause and
for views incompatible with the Soviet ideology, he was imprisoned and
he died in a concentration camp — tr.) called the Ukrainians “a nation
of sergeants.” Now, in the independent Ukraine, this definition no
longer applies, but it still can be used as reference to the position of
the Ukrainian women in society — they are always ready to take on any
tasks imposed upon them; they are held accountable for everything and
anything; they are always badly needed at work and in the family;
however, they must always remember that they are only “sergeants” with
men being of higher ranks, they must always remember where they belong,
and must never aspire to become generals. They are free though to
indulge in daydreaming.
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